TAG Bulletin: Q1 2021

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2021. It was last updated on February 16, 2021.

January

• We terminated 4 YouTube channels and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine. This campaign uploaded content in Russian pertaining to current events in Kazakhstan and critical of European Union policies toward Moldova.

• We terminated 5 blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Morocco. This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was critical of the Algerian government. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

• We terminated 5 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. This campaign was linked to a PR firm named AP Exata Intelligence and uploaded content in Portuguese expressing support for several mayoral candidates in Brazil. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

• We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Kyrgyzstan. The campaign uploaded content in Kyrgyz critical of the former President Almazbek Atambayev and the opposition leader Adakhan Madumarov. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

• We terminated 3 advertising accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Egypt. This campaign was linked to a PR firm named Mubashier and uploaded content in Arabic supportive of the Russian government across several countries in the Middle East.

• We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian on current events in Ukraine.

• We terminated 1 YouTube channel, 2 advertising accounts and 1 mobile developer account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the U.S. election and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

• We terminated 5 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the annexation of Crimea and the Syrian civil war.

• We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian on historical events in Afghanistan, Armenia and Ukraine.

• We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the U.S. current events and Alexei Navalny political rallies.

• We terminated 2,946 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and growing U.S. political divisions. We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q3 and Q4 TAG bulletins.

by Shane HuntleyThreat Analysis Group via The Keyword